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Social and economic logics 
A B S T R A C T   
In this paper we explore how blockchain and smart contracts can build trust and act as catalysts for sustainable 
social businesses by supporting the coexistence of social and economic logics of social ventures. To achieve this 
we draw upon Yunus’ seven principles of social business to present six emergent questions challenging how 
blockchain can improve the sustainability of social ventures and support the fulfilment of the principles. Our 
contribution is a social business blockchain model, codifying Yunus’ principles as smart contract functions, of-
fering novel insights into how blockchain could be utilised to promote the coexistence of social and economic 
logics (i.e. the defining characteristics of a social business). In addition, it demonstrates that implementation of 
this technology elicits new types of trust relationships between stakeholders, social businesses and the block-
chain, which can be facilitated through the use of smart contracts.   
1.0. Introduction 
Since the emergence of blockchain in 2008 as a distributed ledger to 
store all transactions (Zachariadis et al., 2019), and its application to 
cryptocurrency (e.g. Bitcoin), there has been an upsurge in literature 
exploring the application of blockchain technology to a range of areas. 
These include financial services (Yang et al., 2019), health (Tapscott and 
Tapscott, 2017), governance (Pereira et al., 2019), the Internet of Things 
(Christidis and Devetsikiotis, 2016) and supply chains (Bodkhe et al., 
2020). A small number of authors have established a basis upon which to 
connect digital technology (e.g. social media) with social business (e.g. 
Daowd et al., 2020; Lanza-Cruz et al., 2018; Ashraf et al., 2019). In the 
latest evolutionary phase of blockchain there is an increased focus on 
distributed real-time ledgers and the seamless integration of smart 
contracts replacing paper-based agreements (Holland et al., 2018), all of 
which are regulated by the peer-to-peer network infrastructure. 
Recently, smart contracts have attracted attention due to the benefits 
they bring for businesses and organisations, by reducing uncertainty and 
improving trust and transparency in the interactions between stake-
holders (e.g. Pereira et al., 2019). Despite the surge in interest in 
blockchain, there remains a limited understanding of whether this 
technology can improve the sustainability of social businesses and how 
it may be applied within this context. In a recent survey of 600 execu-
tives from 15 different territories, PwC (2018) found that 84% had at 
least some involvement with blockchain technology. In the same vein, 
Gartner (2017) found that 82% of all blockchain-related activity is 
within the financial services sector; however, the use of blockchain is 
expected to grow in a number of sectors, with a potential annual revenue 
forecast of $175 billion by 2025. 
The term ‘social business’ refers to an organisational entity whose 
primary aim is to solve some social/environmental problem, and which 
uses income generating activities to sustain its operations and growth 
(Austin et al., 2006; Peerally et al., 2019). Extant literature has focused 
heavily on the tension that exists between these social and financial 
objectives (Moss et al., 2011). For instance, if the business pays limited 
attention to financial sustainability, it will fail and be unable to meet its 
social objectives (Siwale et al., 2021). This means that although social 
and environmental sustainability benefits should remain a priority for 
social businesses, by improving their financial sustainability, social 
businesses will be more likely to endure in the market, improve their 
social impact, and attract potential investors as they create a more 
financially viable profile (Scarlata and Alemany, 2010; Smith and 
Besharov, 2019). Similarly, if the business becomes more preoccupied 
with financial performance it may neglect some of its crucial social 
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objectives; this is known as ‘mission drift’ (Cornforth, 2014). 
The mission drift debate has gained much traction within the liter-
ature, with a strong focus on how organisations balance social and 
economic objectives to function effectively and sustainably (Smith and 
Besharov, 2019). However, this assumes that financial and social ob-
jectives sit on a continuum whereby one inevitably compromises the 
other (Florin and Schmidt, 2011). This view, which separates ‘social’ 
and ‘business’ as concepts on different ends of a continuum that are ‘at 
odds’ (and thus need to be traded off), might lead to ambiguity and loss 
of trust between an organisation and its stakeholders, resulting in 
several issues such as loss of funding and social capital (Seanor and 
Meaton, 2008). These may have a detrimental impact on its sustained 
operation. More recently, research has pointed towards an alternative 
perspective: a coexistence of social and financial objectives (Muñoz and 
Kimmitt, 2019). This perspective enables objectives to work together 
more harmoniously; it also reduces tensions and improves engagement 
with external stakeholders, enabling social businesses to avoid mission 
drift. Although research has highlighted the benefits of blockchain in 
supporting meaningful interactions between stakeholders by improving 
trust and transparency and reducing uncertainty, we still know very 
little about the role these technological innovations might have in 
enabling this coexistence of financial and social objectives. 
In this paper, we aim to explore how blockchain technology in the 
form of smart contracts can enable the development of more sustainable 
social businesses and support the coexistence of social and financial 
objectives. We propose a conceptual model for a ‘social business 
blockchain’ (i.e. a blockchain that is designed to help uphold the ideals 
of a social business). To do so, we unify the areas of social business, trust, 
blockchain and smart contracts, building on the principles of Yunus 
(2010) to stimulate a set of questions at the intersection of these four 
areas. In so doing, the paper makes three key contributions. First, 
theoretically, we build on the novel notion of social and economic logic 
coexistence (Muñoz and Kimmitt, 2019) to demonstrate how both ob-
jectives may work together harmoniously when facilitated by a tech-
nological agent such as a social blockchain. Second, we contribute to 
literature at the intersection of social business and technological inno-
vation by showing how new technologies can be used to allow organi-
sations to interact more effectively. Whilst most literature in this domain 
has only emerged recently, it principally focuses on how the techno-
logical innovations offered by social entrepreneurs meet some social 
and/or environmental need (Ramani et al., 2017). Thus, we respond to 
calls for more detailed research into the conditions under which social 
enterprises may become more effective (Engelke et al., 2015). 
Finally, by exploring the role that blockchain technology can play in 
creating and supporting more sustainable social businesses (in terms of 
their financial sustainability but also by supporting the social and/or 
environmental sustainability benefits they strive to deliver), we 
contribute to showing the way that this technology may be further 
developed and utilised by social business practitioners and stakeholders. 
Our aim is to create a conceptual map that clearly outlines how 
blockchain-based smart contracts can be implemented within a social 
business model, to support Yunus’ principles and improve interactions 
and trust between stakeholders. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we present the theoretical 
background on social business and social entrepreneurship. Second, we 
explore the theoretical perspectives on trust and how they manifest in 
the context of blockchain and social business. Third, we provide insights 
into the technical elements of blockchain, before highlighting how smart 
contracts can be a trust intermediary between blockchain implementa-
tion and social businesses and their stakeholders. Fourth, we demon-
strate how blockchain can answer the key questions that emerge from 
our analysis of the literature. Fifth, we conclude by presenting our 
conceptual model for a social business blockchain, and providing some 
direction for future research. 
2.0. Theoretical background 
2.1. Social business 
The literature on social business has grown significantly in the last 
decade (Stephan et al., 2016). To understand the key debates in this 
space, we reviewed this literature to thematically unpick key concepts, 
ideas and current areas of contention. Following Austin et al. (2006), the 
literature on social businesses has broadly followed four themes: op-
portunity, organisational mission, resources and performance 
measurement. 
In terms of opportunities, Austin et al. (2006) identified how these 
emerge for social businesses when markets (or governments) fail. Prior 
research identifies how institutional and market failures represent the 
sources of opportunities for social entrepreneurs (Mair and Marti, 2009). 
For example, the failure of most financial institutions in large parts of 
the developing world to represent the poorest led to the emergence of 
microfinance institutions, designed specifically as services for the mar-
ginalised. Although this represented the early understanding of how 
social ventures emerge, more recent research has looked at the symbolic 
judgments of social justice, in particular communities of entrepreneurs 
(Kimmitt and Munoz, 2018). Such a perspective is part of a more critical 
turn in understanding the various moral and ethical motivations of so-
cial entrepreneurs (Dey and Lehner, 2017; Tucker et al., 2019) and how 
complex settings are navigated to co-create opportunities (Corner and 
Ho, 2010). 
Relatedly, a significant volume of research has sought to understand 
the drivers of organisational mission. Researchers have described social 
businesses as types of ‘hybrid organisations’ (Smith and Besharov, 
2019). They are labelled as hybrids because of their dual mission ob-
jectives. On the one hand, their main purpose is to assist in solving some 
kind of social/environmental problem (e.g. reducing homelessness); on 
the other, they must also be market-oriented and create sufficient rev-
enue to survive and thrive (e.g. being contracted by a local authority to 
deliver a social intervention with the homeless). These dual objectives 
are often regarded as stemming from different purpose-driven and 
financial logics which may not be compatible with one another (Batti-
lana and Dorado, 2010). 
A large body of research has therefore focused on trying to under-
stand how these seemingly incompatible institutional logics can be 
resolved. Smith and Besharov (2019) discuss how organisations balance 
change processes between these dual objectives, whilst Gümüsay et al. 
(2020) make similar claims around ‘elasticity’ in venture adaptation. 
Elsewhere, research has identified the importance of developing tactics 
within the workforce to blend logics and carry the venture development 
forward (Battilana and Dorado, 2010). In short, this literature has 
identified how the dual objectives are managed strategically to reshape 
identities and elicit smoother organisational performance. 
However, proactive management of these diverse drivers of organ-
isational performance does not always occur, leading to what is regu-
larly labelled ‘mission drift’: “a process of organizational change, where 
an organization diverges from its main purpose or mission” (Cornforth, 
2014, p. 3). For social businesses, the most widely reported cause of 
mission drift is commercialisation. For example, the primary purpose of 
the pro-social microfinance industry is to reduce poverty through giving 
access to financial services. Yet these financial service organisations 
have also started to behave more like formal banks, focusing more on the 
financial bottom line as the lure of improved profits overtakes the desire 
for social change (Mersland and Strøm, 2010). Thus, when income takes 
prevalence over social purpose, mission drift is seen to be occurring. 
This ties in with the third theme: resource mobilisation. Mission drift is 
widely conceived to have negative consequences for organisations, 
which may suffer from losses in legitimacy (Kwong et al., 2017) and 
trust (Milbourne and Cushman, 2013), thus weakening performance 
through access to financial resources (Gras and Mendoza-Abarca, 2014). 
Research has identified that the tensions associated with the 
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mobilisation of resources (both human and financial) can delegitimise a 
social business, ultimately eliciting failure (Siwale et al., 2021). There-
fore, mission drift is a complex concept that brings together organisa-
tional strategic decision-making and actor motivations, as well as the 
capacity to mobilise the necessary resources to be financially 
sustainable. 
In contrast, some literature has emphasised the potential positive 
relationship between organisational mission and resource mobilisation. 
In the prior microfinance example, it could be suggested that improving 
the financial sustainability of an organisation makes it more likely to 
endure and offer a diverse portfolio to the financially disadvantaged. 
Further, social enterprises typically struggle to access finance because 
they signal complex messages to potential investors who have varying 
levels of financial and social sector expertise (Scarlata and Alemany, 
2010). The impact investment market also lacks co-ordination, and in-
vestment readiness is problematic (Scarlata et al., 2017; Gregory et al., 
2012; Clarkin, 2014). Thus, opportunities to exploit earned income 
strategies are crucial to financial viability and even form the basis for 
exploring new areas for social impact (Smith and Besharov, 2019). 
This social impact also represents a key thread in social business 
research relating to performance measurement. Whilst traditional ac-
counting measures are accepted in commercial entities, social impact 
measurement is more opaque and inherently subjective (Gamble and 
Beer, 2017). Furthermore, scholars have identified serious issues with 
attribution: it is challenging to causally tie the work of a social venture 
to a particular social outcome (Lowe, 2013; Lowe and Wilson, 2017). 
However, social impact measurement has a role in terms of organisa-
tional learning; in its absence, social ventures appear to perform more 
poorly (Muñoz and Kimmitt, 2019). Moreover, social impact data can 
act as a positive signal to potential investors and other stakeholders 
(Gamble and Beer, 2017; Parhankangas and Renko, 2017). 
In summary, prior research on social businesses broadly fits into 
these domains, with a variety of underlying theoretical constructs and 
debates; these are summarised in Table 1. In particular, the literature 
gives significant attention to the mission drift concept, but without fully 
acknowledging some key assumptions. One consistent theme across 
research is the relevance of the ‘balance’ between social and economic 
dimensions. 
Florin and Schmidt (2011) pose a continuum of social and economic 
objectives under the notion that moving too close to the social side will 
produce economic vulnerabilities, whilst moving too close to economic 
objectives will distract from the core purpose of the venture; one must 
balance the scales rather than tip them. Thus, ‘balanced growth’ through 
mission interdependencies becomes an important strategy for retaining 
organisational harmony and performance (Siebold et al., 2019). This 
also sharpens the focus on another issue with research into mission drift, 
which is the assumed intentionality behind it. As Muñoz and Kimmitt 
(2019) highlight, the micro-foundations of the entrepreneurial process 
interact with other strategically focused approaches. The entrepre-
neurial process is understood as decision-making under conditions of 
uncertainty, meaning that the creation and direction of social ventures 
may not be clear even to the social entrepreneur (Zahra et al., 2009). 
When the venture proposition unfolds, as the entrepreneur receives new 
information (Servantie and Rispal, 2018), they gradually make sense of 
what constitutes a social problem, and the necessary business model 
needed (to be designed) to solve it. As such, the ‘main mission’ or 
‘purpose’ of a social business, as outlined by Cornforth (2014), may be 
more opaque in some contexts than in others. For social businesses, 
mission and the underlying business model design are iteratively 
co-created to work together. 
However, as Muñoz and Kimmitt (2019) argue, social and economic 
objectives are not mutually exclusive. Both can operate at once as 
strategic foci of the venture to enable competitive advantage, and one 
focus does not necessarily compromise the other; that is, mission drift is 
not inevitable. Thus, if we are to develop a more sophisticated under-
standing of mission drift or mission ‘balance’, we ought to consider a 
holistic approach that embraces opportunity, mission, resources and per-
formance measurement simultaneously. 
Whilst our thematic analysis of the evolution of the social business 
concept identifies these key areas of debate, the absence of facilitating 
technology within the discussion is highly problematic. In particular, 
integrating this with our understanding of blockchain technology will 
help to enlighten the debate and facilitate our understanding of tech-
nology’s role in the coexistence, rather than ‘balance’ or ‘drift’, of social 
and economic objectives. 
In this paper, we take the view that this is a relational process built by 
trust, which may be elicited by blockchain technology. We draw upon 
Yunus’ (2010) seven social business principles (see Table 2) as the basis 
for our model. Although several concepts and frameworks have been 
developed to communicate a business focus on both financial and social 
objectives (e.g. non-profit organisations and CSR), Yunus’ Social Busi-
ness Principles have been selected as the basis of our model as they 
Table 1 
Thematic analysis of social business concepts  
Themes Main Premise Key Concepts Key Literature Debates Supporting Literature 
Opportunity Social businesses see market 








Social businesses co-create and develop opportunities 
collectively with stakeholders and beneficiary 
communities in response to market failures. 
Social businesses have multiple complex motivations 
and are not morally neutral endeavours. 
Corner & Ho (2010); Mair & Marti 
(2009); Perrini et al. (2010);  
González et al. (2017). 
Kimmitt & Muñoz (2018); Dey & 
Lehner (2017); Zahra et al. (2009);  
Tucker et al. (2019). 
Mission Social businesses have a distinct 






Social businesses lose sight of their social mission when 
they start to grow and become more financially 
sustainable. 
Successful social businesses combine multiple 
institutional logics, identities, and missions that, within 
an organisational setting, do not conventionally 
complement one another. 
Cornforth (2014); Kwong et al. 
(2017); Mersland & Strøm (2010). 
Battilana & Dorado (2010); Smith & 




Social businesses have limited 




There are significant barriers in accessing finance; 
commercial investors have a limited understanding of 
the social business model. 
The social investment market lacks coordination, 
leading to supply and demand issues. 
Gras & Mendoza-Abarca (2014);  
Bugg-Levine & Emerson (2011);  
Chen & Harrison (2020). 
Scarlata et al. (2017); Gregory et al. 
(2012); Clarkin (2014). 
Performance 
Measurement 
Social businesses measure their 
performance through social 
impact measurement 
Attribution; social 
return on investment 
Learning and signalling 
Quantifying the impact of social businesses is 
challenging given attribution errors. 
Social businesses measure social impact to learn about 
their interventions and signal performance to investors. 
Lowe (2013); Lowe & Wilson 
(2017); Solórzano-García et al. 
(2019). 
Scarlata & Alemany (2010); Gamble 
& Beer (2017); Parhankangas & 
Renko (2017).  
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provide a specific set of defining criteria, combining both a macro- and 
micro-economic view of how these two objectives coexist in such an 
organisation (Ballesteros-Sola, 2015; Grove and Berg, 2014). Based on 
our examination of this literature, we will now discuss the role of trust in 
binding social and economic objectives. 
2.2. Trust in social business 
The ‘traditional’ view, which considers social businesses as 
balancing social and financial objectives, creates an interesting paradox: 
as social businesses try to improve their financial sustainability, moving 
towards the ‘financial’ end of the continuum, they compromise their 
focus on their social cause. This, however, may worsen their financial 
situation, as the stakeholders that support and fund their operations (e.g. 
through donations) will not see the social impact they expect their in-
vestment to make (Florin and Schmidt, 2011), which may result in loss 
of financial support. As such, a more contemporary approach to social 
businesses may be required that supports the coexistence of the two 
types of objectives, without one compromising the other. 
This approach highlights the importance of trust in developing sus-
tainable social business models. On the one hand, social businesses need 
to trust that if they focus on achieving their social goals, stakeholders 
will support their cause financially. On the other hand, stakeholders 
need to trust that their investments in social businesses contribute to the 
achievement of both financial and social objectives, to make a difference 
to beneficiaries. To understand how trust can help to facilitate the 
coexistence of social and economic logics – that is, the trust relationship 
between stakeholders (individuals) and the social business (organisa-
tion) – it is important to explore the theoretical perspectives on trust. 
Morgan and Hunt (1994, p. 23) define trust as “existing when one 
party has confidence in an exchange partner’s reliability and integrity”. 
They suggest that the integrity of the ‘trustworthy’ party will be asso-
ciated with qualities such as “consistent, competent, honest, fair, 
responsible, helpful and benevolent”. Pirson and Malhotra (2011) 
highlight the distinction between interpersonal trust (i.e. the extent to 
which individuals trust other individuals along relevant trustworthiness 
dimensions), and organisational trust (i.e. the extent to which in-
dividuals trust an organisation). Furthermore, there is much debate in 
the literature about organisational and institutional trust (David et al., 
2019; Ellonen et al., 2008). For the purposes of this article, we focus on 
social businesses as organisations (i.e. systematic collections of people 
working together for a desired end with a common identity), rather than 
the more abstract notion of ‘an institution’, which may or may not 
include an organisation. 
Although the concept of trust has gained popularity in several 
business-related disciplines, including marketing and consumer behav-
iour, authors have suggested that in the context of innovation and 
technology (in organisations), there are two main areas of debate: trust 
in the technology and trust in the innovating organisation (Hengstler 
et al., 2016). Pirson and Malhotra (2011, p. 1089) highlight that trust in 
organisations “entails the willingness of individuals (customers, em-
ployees, etc.) to accept vulnerability to the actions of an organisation 
based on positive expectations”. Further to this, Pirson and Malhotra 
(2011, p. 1091) explored organisational trust through the dimensions of 
depth (Sheppard and Sherman, 1998) and locus (Schoorman, 2007) (i.e. 
“the stakeholder’s position (internal versus external) vis-à-vis the or-
ganization”). Pirson and Malhotra’s study extended the three traditional 
dimensions of trust – ability, benevolence and integrity (Mayer et al., 
1995) – adding three new dimensions. These were transparency, iden-
tification, managerial competence and technical competence (the latter 
two are bifurcated from the original dimension of ‘ability’) (see Table 3). 
Extant research highlights trust as an essential component for social 
businesses. It can contribute to the development and operationalisation 
of effective social business models, help social businesses attract and 
maintain funding and sponsorships, and enable them to achieve their 
social and economic objectives (e.g. Jabłńoński and Jabłoński, 2019; 
Mukkamala et al., 2018). As social businesses rely on funds from in-
dividuals, governments and/or organisations (i.e. social investors) for 
their operations, building trust with these investors is vital to ensure 
consistent funding that will enable them to support their projects 
(Mukkamala et al., 2018). As stakeholders desire their investments to be 
impactful and benefit society, they look for mechanisms that provide 
them with trustworthy information and offer them certainty regarding 
their investment (Rickert, 2017). 
Curtis et al. (2010) explain that trust is an essential non-financial 
resource for social businesses from the very early stage of business 
development (start-up). The authors support the idea that trust between 
social businesses and stakeholders precedes the actual performance of 
the social business, as in many cases investors and other stakeholders are 
required to trust and support the social business prior to it having a 
Table 2 
Yunus’ seven principles and insights  
Yunus’ Principles (Yunus, 2010) 
1. Business objective will be to overcome poverty, or one or more problems (e.g. education, health, technology access and environment) which threaten people and society; not 
profit maximisation. 
2. The company will attain financial and economic sustainability. 
3. Investors get back their investment amount only. No dividend is given beyond the return of the original investment. 
4. When the investment amount is paid back, profit stays with the company for expansion and improvement. 
5. The company will be environmentally conscious. 
6. Workforce gets market wage with better-than-standard working conditions. 
7. ...Do it with joy!!!  
Table 3 
-Pirson and Malhotra’s (2011) Dimensions of Trust  
Dimensions of trust Supporting literature Description 
Managerial competence 
(bifurcated from Ability) 
Chawla (2020); Pirson & Malhotra 
(2011) 
Organisational abilities denoting strategic vision and decision-making. Reciprocal faith in others to work 
towards team goals rather than narrow or self-interested agendas. 
Technical competence (bifurcated 
from Ability) 
Chawla (2020); Pirson & Malhotra 
(2011) 
Organisational ability to deliver superior products and services. Reciprocal faith in team members to 
successfully complete the tasks in their area of expertise. 
Benevolence Mayer et al. (1995) Considers if the trustee exhibits goodwill toward the trustor and is concerned for the trustor’s wellbeing. 
Integrity Mayer et al. (1995) Gauges whether a trustee is perceived as forthcoming, honest, and of requisite moral character. 
Transparency Mishra (1996); Tschannen-Moran 
(2000) 
The perceived willingness to share trust-relevant information with vulnerable stakeholders. 
Identification Lewicki & Bunker (1996); Sitkin & 
Roth (1993) 
Concerned with the understanding and internalisation of the interests and intentions of the other party, 
based on shared values and commitment.  
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demonstrable track record in achieving its socioeconomic objectives. 
Nevertheless, social businesses also need to ensure that funding remains 
commensurate with the nature and scale of their project activity; as 
such, trust can play an important role in the sustainability and long-term 
success of social businesses (Mukkamala et al., 2018). However, a lack of 
transparency – a common issue in sectors where external funding and 
donations are important, such as charities and social business – can limit 
trust and make the process of investor recruitment and funding gener-
ation even more challenging (Rickert, 2017). 
In addition to attracting investors and funding, trust can support the 
development of more meaningful relationships between stakeholders, 
exceeding usual contractual and financial relationships. This can further 
contribute to the development of sustainable social businesses, as 
studies suggest that trust (alongside a number of other factors such as 
cooperation and community integration) can support mutually benefi-
cial relationships between multiple stakeholders and improve stake-
holder satisfaction and value (Curtis et al., 2010; Jabłonski and 
Jabłonski, 2019; Haigh and Hoffman, 2012). However, as social busi-
nesses grow and expand in order to increase the impact of their activ-
ities, this can create issues with trust, as the impact of factors such as 
local ties, communal trust-building, and business values and vision may 
diminish with size (Haigh and Hoffman, 2012). This can have a detri-
mental impact, particularly for organisations that depend for their suc-
cess on the trust built through local connections, where beneficiary 
engagement and an ethos of co-creation are central to understanding the 
social problem at hand (Kimmitt and Muñoz, 2018). 
From the above it can be seen that recruiting, retaining and devel-
oping strong relationships with stakeholders (e.g. beneficiaries, in-
vestors, employees, community members, suppliers) is essential to 
ensure consistent funding and the sustainability of a social business. 
Trust can play a key role in the value that social businesses create, as it 
will have a direct impact on the capability of the social business to 
perform its activities to achieve its objectives. Despite the importance of 
trust for social businesses, currently there are limited mechanisms in 
place for social businesses to encourage trust in the system. As most 
social businesses, unlike companies or governments, lack the financial 
means and resources to build the required trust through resource- 
intensive approaches, they need to find alternative methods to 
improve and communicate trust. Nevertheless, despite the important 
role of trust in the sustainability and effectiveness of social businesses 
and the increasing use of technology to support different business 
models, there is no extensive research on how technology can improve 
trust as a crucial component of social business. The current research will 
aim to fill this gap. 
Recent increases in the use of machine learning, blockchain, artificial 
intelligence and data infrastructure are concomitant with an increased 
reliance on computational algorithms to make decisions (Lee, 2018). 
Lustig and Nardi (2015) posit that increased use of blockchain and 
cryptocurrency (such as Bitcoin) has led to the emergence of a new kind 
of trust: algorithmic trust. Chawla (2020, p. 5) defines algorithmic trust 
as that which “pervades the protocol, and application layers of a 
blockchain, and focuses on the technical competence, and transparency 
dimensions of trust”. 
With these new types of technology, users must move away from 
traditional forms of trust, giving way to algorithms and software to make 
decisions (Chawla, 2020). Users must also be able to trust the social 
context within which the code that forms the algorithms is constructed 
and maintained (i.e. the code writers/architects) (Hawlitschek et al., 
2018; Lustig and Nardi, 2015). This is augmented by the arcane tech-
nical nature of coding, resulting in very few people being able to un-
derstand the algorithms that underpin blockchains (Kellogg et al., 
2020). This is supported by Kizilcec (2016), who highlights the link 
between transparency and trust, and particularly the need to support 
complex algorithms with explanations, so that users who are not au fait 
with the technicalities are able to assimilate key information. 
Chawla (2020, p. 4) highlights that the notion of trust in relation to 
blockchain design is “unique from the perspectives of traditional 
organisational theories [such as Agency Theory and Resource Based 
View] thus, trust [in blockchain] is embodied differently”. While pre-
vious studies regarding trust and social business have explored multiple 
traditional theories (Dacin et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2013), such as 
Stewardship Theory (e.g. Ballesteros-Sola, 2015), Stakeholder Theory 
(e.g. Cooney, 2012; Greenwood and Van Buren III, 2010) and Institu-
tional Theory (e.g. Pache and Santos, 2010), we build upon Chawla 
(2020) to demonstrate how certain dimensions of trust, focused on 
technical competence and transparency, can enable the social and eco-
nomic logics of social ventures to coexist. 
2.3. The Blockchain 
The blockchain has evolved from storing purely financial trans-
actions to anything of value. This includes supply chain records 
(Queiroz and Wamba, 2019), residency information (Sullivan and 
Burger, 2017) and in some cases governance data (Hastig and Sodhi, 
2020). Schlecht et al. (2021, p. 2) define a blockchain as a shared 
resource on a “decentralised network of computers each based on 
mathematics and advanced cryptography, where each transaction can 
be verified by the entire network”. Thus, the blockchain is a permanent, 
incorruptible decentralised digital ledger (Jabbar and Dani, 2020). 
It is decentralisation that differentiates the blockchain from tradi-
tional relational or big data systems (Jabbar et al., 2019). In such a 
solution, control is delegated to individual computers (nodes) that are 
tasked with validating and verifying transactions before they are added 
to the blockchain network. Each node keeps a copy of the ledger which is 
continuously synchronised with the rest of the computers in the network 
every time a change takes place (Ankalkoti and Santhosh, 2017). This 
approach has multiple advantages. First, it removes a single point of 
failure, so if the network is attacked or a node is out of action, the 
network is still resilient and continues to function. Second, it stops any 
unauthorised transactions unless all nodes agree and allows control to be 
shared across the network. These key elements play a significant role in 
creating a secure permanent data solution as all transactions are first 
verified amongst the nodes, before they are added to the blockchain 
network (Li et al., 2019). This innovative approach to data storage and 
verification can remove reliance on intermediaries and ensure that the 
transfer of goods and services within this context is quick, reliable, 
authentic and efficient (Yang et al., 2019). 
Thus, the notion that no specific individual or government entity has 
control over a blockchain creates many opportunities for business 
growth within the forms of new business and revenue models, innova-
tive software platforms and new approaches to how data is governed, 
managed and used (Sternberg et al., 2020). Within the blockchain, data 
is bundled into blocks which are packaged based on aspects of speed, 
frequency and complexity (Sharples, 2002). Data are compiled into a 
hash and this is stored in the blockchain. Any potential changes to the 
data create a new hash while also linking to the previous block, hence 
creating a change process and a chain of transactions. 
Fig. 1 outlines how data are stored and hashes are created. This is a 
fundamental process: all blockchain transactions must follow these rules 
before they can be verified and stored. As highlighted in the illustration, 
each new block creation has a direct link with the previous block, 
providing a history of changes and transactions. In order for this to be 
achieved successfully, Jabbar and Dani (2020) outline five significant 
steps: (1) a call must be made to the blockchain; (2) the proposed 
transaction is packaged as a block ready for distribution to the nodes; (3) 
the block is then distributed; (4) the miners complete the necessary steps 
to approve the transaction; and (5) the verified block is added to the 
blockchain, and a hash is generated that connects the current block to 
the previous block, creating a chain. 
Hence, the five steps highlight that while there is a structure to the 
blockchain, there is also a flexible resilience, allowing for the creation of 
an incorruptible ledger where transactions cannot be manipulated or 
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edited without the permission of other users in the network (Jabbar and 
Dani, 2020). Any such attempt to make changes starts a ‘chain reaction’, 
where a new data hash is created and appended to the preceding record, 
and this change is transmitted to the rest of the nodes in the network, 
which update ledgers accordingly (Yeoh, 2017). 
With respect to blockchain and the dimensions of trust, Chawla 
(2020, p. 4) suggests that there appears to be an “amplification of the 
trust dimensions of ability [technical competence] and transparency”. In 
our proposed application of blockchain to social businesses, the ampli-
fication of these dimensions seems logical because both the trustees’ 
(party to be trusted: blockchain developers and social businesses) ability 
to create algorithms, and the trustors’ (stakeholders) ability to evaluate 
and understand them, are vital. This is supported by Bachmann’s (2003) 
notion of systems trust which refers to the trust individual stakeholders 
have in the functioning and relatability of systems. According to 
Hosmer (1995), this kind of trust is process-based and tied to a record of 
past operation; this is particularly poignant given the nature of block-
chain design (i.e. an incorruptible ledger). 
While algorithmic trust focuses on the trust that stakeholders are 
required to have in the technical elements of blockchain, the social/ 
organisational aspects also require consideration (Chawla, 2020). 
Greenwood and Van Buren III (2010, p. 425) explain that “trust in the 
organization–stakeholder relationship, and the trustworthiness of the 
organization to that relationship, is fundamental to the moral treatment 
of stakeholders”. The authors postulate a new form of collective trust, 
namely organisational trust, which is concomitant with the argument 
that an organisation is a moral agent (Collier, 1998; Moore, 1999) with a 
moral identity and the capacity to be virtuous (Moore, 2005). Chawla 
(2020) presents a model which highlights the social layers at the ‘top’ of 
the blockchain stack, as a part of organisational trust. This layer deals 
with the humans that develop the blockchain code; as such it is domi-
nated by the dimensions of trust, such as ability, benevolence, integrity, 
transparency and identification. 
While both Chawla (2020) and Pirson and Malhotra (2011) agree 
that the social layer is the enabler of the technological layers, Chawla 
(2020, p. 4) argues that the type of blockchain and range of stakeholders 
will determine the overall balance of the trust dimensions. However, it is 
clear within the blockchain, the focus is shifted “from an organizational, 
and legal regime to one that is largely algorithmic, and an associated 
social layer that propagates, and maintains the blockchain” (Chawla, 
2020, p. 5). 
2.4. Smart contracts as a trust intermediary 
Smart contracts are a digital construct based around the notion of 
codified promises, rules and regulations (Antonopoulos and Wood, 
2018). These contracts are software code which can be programmed to 
execute certain actions based on specific conditions being met (Jabbar 
and Dani, 2020). Research by Dolgui et al. (2019) proposes that smart 
contracts can remove reliance on intermediaries within organisational 
transactions (Christidis and Devetsikiotis, 2016). Many pilot studies 
surrounding smart contracts and blockchain are currently underway. 
For example, in Korea, the KCS (Korea Customs Service) is investigating 
the use of smart contracts to embed and execute custom processes for 
imports and exports (WCO News, 2021). In Rotterdam, a microgrid 
electricity platform developed by S&P Global Platts and Blocklab is 
being utilised to actively trade renewable energy derived from solar and 
battery storage; this is claimed to be the first high-frequency decen-
tralised energy market (Smart Energy International, 2020). Thus, in this 
context, the smart contracts act as the intermediary and play a crucial 
role in enforcing agreements between two parties. Therefore, as part of a 
technical solution, the blockchain is the permanent data store, and for 
smart contracts to be effective and neutral they must be deployed to the 
blockchain and synchronised to all nodes (Castellanos et al., 2017). 
Thus, smart contracts create endless opportunities for the codifica-
tion of rules and regulations that can support the development and op-
erations of more sustainable social businesses. The codification process 
allows for self-enforcing smart contracts, which are based on data inputs 
that can occur in real time depending on the processing approach 
(Jabbar et al., 2019). This, however, creates its own challenges, as a 
smart contract needs to be scrutinised by all parties before it is appended 
to the blockchain. An oblivious approach to agreements at this stage can 
be very expensive and difficult to modify at a later date (Pereira et al., 
2019). 
3.0. Discussion: addressing the emerging questions through 
blockchain 
Existing research has discussed some of the key components of 
blockchain for social businesses. For instance, Mukkamala et al. (2018) 
discuss blockchain technology as an opportunity built on trust, trans-
parency, anonymity, privacy, decentralisation and auditability. They 
explore the suitability of blockchain technology for addressing the 
problems of social businesses; however, the use of smart contracts to 
alleviate and implement the core components is not explored in any 
depth. 
Table 4 provides an overview of the seven principles and the emer-
gent questions that our blockchain model will address in order to build 
trust and demonstrate how the social and economic logics of social 
ventures can coexist. We highlight six emergent questions elicited from 
the work of Yunus (2010) to aid our conceptualisation of how block-
chain technology, through the use of smart contracts, can support the 
coexistence of the social and economic logics of social ventures. In this 
section, we will answer the emergent questions to demonstrate how 
blockchain design, combined with relevant elements of trust, can pro-
vide fresh insights into the use of blockchain in social ventures. Essen-
tially, all decisions are made within the network by verified members 
and all decisions are final. When coupled with smart contracts there is a 
Fig. 1. Data storage and hash creation in a blockchain  
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component of Artificial Intelligence (AI) which can govern these re-
lationships and transactions (Jabbar and Dani, 2020). The advantage of 
such an approach within social ventures is that all objectives can be 
mutually agreed upon by all members; this is decentralisation (Wang 
et al., 2018). In addition, future changes cannot be made without the 
explicit acknowledgement of the members (Hastig and Sodhi, 2020). 
From a social business perspective, this aspect of transparency can 
ensure that social ventures continue to work towards agreed social ob-
jectives. If social ventures veer away from original pre-agreed objectives 
and KPIs, smart contracts can be used to enforce the original rules 
(Castellanos et al., 2017). 
Traditionally, trying to ensure that social ventures meet their social 
objectives involves a significant amount of trust being placed by the 
trustors (stakeholders) in the trustee (the organisation / social business). 
This has an impact on the quality of the relationships between stake-
holders (Pirson and Malhotra, 2011). However, the utilisation of 
blockchain technology means stakeholders could reduce the amount of 
trust they have to place in the social business, instead shifting it to the 
technology underpinning the blockchain. 
This highlights the increased focus on technical ability (algorithmic 
trust) and transparency (Chawla, 2020), replacing more traditional 
interpersonal and interorganisational trust. 
The mutual agreement of the objectives located within the block-
chain can have two main trust-related benefits. First, a mutual learning 
process between social ventures (trustee) and their beneficiaries 
(trustor) has been identified as being crucial to social venturing that 
reflects local realities and ultimately produces community-led social 
solutions (Kimmitt and Muñoz, 2018). For example, the absence of this 
trust has been shown to lead to deleterious consequences when 
attempting to implement clean water technologies without accounting 
for local cultural dynamics (Saunders and Borland, 2013). Second, 
mutually agreed social objectives are seen as central to productive 
entrepreneur-investor relationships whereby investors provide 
value-added services and support social ventures, allowing them 
Table 4 
Yunus’ Principles and emergent Blockchain Questions  
Yunus’ Principle (Yunus, 2010) Current Insights Supporting 
Literature 
Emerging Questions 
Business objective will be to overcome poverty, or one or 
more problems (such as education, health, technology 
access, and environment) which threaten people and 
society; not profit maximisation. 
⇒ Social enterprises can be profit- 
oriented, but the primary focus is the 
solution to a social/environmental 
problem. 
Austin et al. 
(2006) 




Zahra et al. 
(2009) 
How can blockchain help ensure that social 
ventures meet their social objectives? 
Financial and economic sustainability. ⇒ Social enterprises aim to ‘balance’ 
financial sustainability with their core 
social mission as hybrid forms. 







Gümüsay et al. 
(2020) 
How can blockchain help ensure that social 
ventures meet their financial objectives? 
Investors get back their investment amount only. No dividend 
is given beyond the return of the original investment. 
⇒ Social investment initiates scaling of 
business models and social interventions. 
⇒ Social investors help to shape venture 
goals and mission. 
Scarlata et al. 
(2012) 








How can blockchain help facilitate fair and effective 
relationships between investors and social 
ventures? 
When the investment amount is paid back, profit stays with 
the company for expansion and improvement. 
⇒ Social venture growth can produce 
issues of ‘mission drift’ between core aims 
and growth ambitions. 
Cornforth (2014) 




How can blockchain ensure that investment for 
growth does not lead to mission drift? 
The company will be environmentally conscious. ⇒ The focus of social enterprises is the 
solution of a social/environmental 
problem. 
Perrini et al. 
(2010) 
Mair & Marti 
(2009) 
Gamble & Beer 
(2017) 
Austin et al. 
(2006) 
How can blockchain ensure that organisational 
goals and objectives are congruent with an 
environmentally conscious mindset? 
Workforce gets market wage with better-than-standard 
working conditions. 
⇒ Social enterprises blend paid working 
conditions with voluntary posts. 
...Do it with joy!!! ⇒ Social entrepreneurs hold noble 
motives, driven by empathy and desire for 
social change. 
⇒ Social entrepreneurs hold controversial 
motives, driven by ego and a desire for 
structural change. 
Zahra et al. 
(2009) 
Boluk & Mottiar 
(2014) 
Tucker et al. 
(2019) 




Dey & Lehner 
(2017) 
How can blockchain support meaningful 
interactions that take into account entrepreneurial 
motivation and hold entrepreneurs’ actions to 
account?  
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collectively to achieve the set and pre-agreed social objectives (Di Lor-
enzo and Scarlata, 2019). In short, this allows for a check against any 
potential mission drift as defined by the venture, its beneficiaries and its 
financiers. 
3.1. How can blockchain help ensure that social ventures meet their 
financial objectives? 
Blockchain is by its very definition a distributed ledger (Mukkamala 
et al., 2018) designed and developed for use with the first crypto-
currency – Bitcoin (Zachariadis et al., 2019). It has been viewed and 
utilised as a very flexible tool with a number of use case scenarios. Thus 
far it has been utilised within Fintech (Mori, 2016), supply chains 
(Jabbar and Dani, 2020) and governance (Sullivan and Burger, 2017). 
Therefore, it has evolved from a tool with the primary purpose of storing 
Bitcoin transactions to one that can store anything of value. 
Within a social venture, the blockchain opens new avenues of 
finance, storage and democratisation of objectives. This allows for new 
use cases in creating innovative and forward-looking social ventures 
which draw upon the financial components of the blockchain (Wood-
side et al., 2017). As an arbiter of trust (Kamble et al., 2020), the 
blockchain creates a transparent approach (Kizilcec, 2016) in terms of a 
social venture’s financial objectives and how well they are being met. 
The development of smart contracts stored in the blockchain supports 
the challenges that are faced over the technical transparency of block-
chain, as discussed by Kellogg et al. (2020) and Kizilcec (2016), as the 
contracts enable transparent communication of data across all stake-
holders, improving trust and discouraging potential mission drift. If a 
social venture fails to meet its financial obligations based on pre-agreed 
criteria, the transparency of the blockchain (through the smart con-
tracts) notifies all stakeholders and adjustments can be made (Prashar 
et al., 2020). 
In this context, mission drift can occur if the financial situation of the 
social venture deteriorates to the extent that it can no longer offer 
adequately its product/services. Research has identified how social en-
trepreneurs can become so fixated on growth to mimic corporate 
structures that it undermines their core purpose and leads to failure 
(Siwale et al., 2021). In addition, the presence of investors has been 
shown to push an ‘investment logic’ that tends to outweigh the pursuit of 
a social mission (Castellas et al., 2018). The benefit of blockchain in the 
context of financial objectives is to allow for the pre-agreed financial 
conditions to coexist harmoniously with the social objectives (i.e. the 
mission). 
3.2. How can blockchain facilitate relationships between investors and 
social ventures? 
Early research and blockchain adopters have highlighted the 
importance of a tamperproof system in creating trust in business trans-
actions. Schmidt and Wagner (2019) argue that the role of the block-
chain eliminates the need for trusted third parties. Thus, the blockchain 
is primarily used and viewed as a permanent storage mechanism for all 
transactions of value (Jabbar and Dani, 2020). Some blockchain re-
searchers (e.g. Roeck et al., 2019) define it as an ‘incorruptible distrib-
uted ledger’, immune from unofficial tampering due to the 
‘consensus-based’ algorithm. Some researchers argue that in certain 
industries there is significant disruption because the blockchain removes 
many trust-related issues (Kamble et al., 2020). Building from this, we 
argue that the blockchain has significant potential to facilitate produc-
tive relationships between investors and social ventures. The use of 
technology means that the trust relationship, traditionally between 
investor and social business, will shift to the investor and the blockchain. 
It overcomes the issue articulated by Greenwood and Van Buren III 
(2010, p. 425) whereby “low-power dependent stakeholders have no 
alternative, in the absence of external constraints of self-interested 
behaviour but to rely on the trustworthiness of the organization”. The 
‘alternative’ in this case is the blockchain, which, by virtue of its 
decentralised nature, means that the investor no longer needs to worry 
about the risk of decisions being made which may undermine their 
investment. 
The use of the blockchain adds an additional layer of trust and 
removes the need for third parties (Roeck et al., 2019). This creates a 
direct line between participants, embedding trust at the start of any 
relationship (Yang et al., 2019) and removing concerns that stake-
holders may have about some organisations’ lack of moral 
decision-making. This is even more important in social businesses where 
the social and economic logics are required to coexist (Ebrahim et al., 
2014), and it aids in preventing mission drift (Cornforth, 2014). Addi-
tionally, by removing third parties, the number of stakeholders involved 
is reduced, which can improve trust in relationships and avoid legiti-
macy and governance challenges (Ebrahim et al., 2014). This whole 
process can be managed in real time through the use of smart contracts 
to govern the rules agreed between investors and the social venture 
(Jabbar et al., 2019). 
3.3. How can blockchain ensure that organisational goals and objectives 
are congruent with an environmentally conscious mindset? 
The blockchain is advantageous for many businesses, mainly due to 
transparent data sharing and efficiency in relation to business processes 
and costs (Hasan et al., 2019). This paper has discussed how the trans-
parency of blockchain systems, and their inherent trust-based mecha-
nisms, can help to remove duplicate support services, which can help 
organisations save resources and improve environmental sustainability. 
The environmental impact of blockchain has been severely criticised (e. 
g. the high energy consumption required to mine cryptocurrencies) 
(Vranken, 2017). However, extant research has highlighted the poten-
tial of blockchain technology, and more specifically smart contracts, to 
support energy-efficient transactions (Esmaeilian et al., 2020). This is 
due to the reduced resources required for gathering, processing and 
sharing information, thus creating a more sustainable ecosystem for 
interactions between stakeholders (e.g. Dal Mas et al., 2020; Sal-
merón-Manzano and Manzano-Agugliaro, 2019). 
Within a social business scenario, the blockchain can support more 
resource-efficient transactions and ensure that organisational goals and 
objectives are in constant alignment with an environmentally conscious 
mindset. The implementation and development of smart contracts can 
monitor and store real-time data which is related to the organisation’s 
goals and objectives (e.g. information relating to pollution, environ-
mental degradation and carbon). The real-time nature of the data 
collection and analysis means that decisions can be made efficiently and 
instantaneously (Bai and Sarkis, 2020; Jabbar et al., 2019), resulting in 
cost and efficiency savings that can be reinvested into the social 
enterprise. 
3.4. How can blockchain ensure that investment for growth does not lead 
to mission drift? 
Al Taji and Bengo (2019) argue that social ventures face unexpected 
challenges when they are based on new technology. Technologies such 
as the blockchain create an additional dimension to social ventures, 
leading to new funding areas and building on social and commercial 
aspects. This opens up new areas of research and new opportunities for 
growth (Du et al., 2019). However, while the blockchain may create an 
additional layer of complexity, it also ensures that new investment op-
portunities arise while simultaneously removing the danger of mission 
drift. 
It could be argued that the mere creation of a decentralised block-
chain, which draws upon smart contracts to reach mutually agreed-upon 
principles or functions (between social businesses and stakeholders), 
reduces the chance of mission drift. The blockchain challenges the 
traditional issue with mission drift, whereby social businesses must 
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balance their conflicting social and economic logics on a continuum, 
whereby one can compromise the other (Florin and Schmidt, 2011). The 
fact that stakeholders and social businesses must pre-agree the princi-
ples that are entered into the (permanent) blockchain means that the 
‘balancing’ of social and economic logics is no longer a subjective phe-
nomenon. Rather, the objective nature of the blockchain ensures 
(through the peer network) that the mutually agreed-upon principles are 
upheld by the social business, thus providing a way to operationalise the 
notion of logic coexistence (Muñoz and Kimmitt, 2019). This is partic-
ularly relevant for social businesses, which may lose their initial iden-
tities as they grow (Zahra et al., 2009). 
3.5. How can blockchain help to hold the actions of social entrepreneurs 
to account? 
As blockchain is a permanent data store, where all decisions and 
transactions are held (Biswas and Gupta, 2019), it is open and trans-
parent and lends itself to an environment where actions of individuals 
need to be held to account. Larios-Hernández (2017) argues that for the 
majority of social ventures and social entrepreneurs, informal 
peer-to-peer practice is customary, and decisions are often made with 
verbal agreements so that much emphasis is placed on trust. 
In this context the potential to hold social entrepreneurs to account 
diminishes rapidly and decisions which have been agreed cannot easily 
be enforced. Here, smart contracts can build context around decisions 
and how they have evolved and can enforce key decisions (based on pre- 
agreed rules) (Jabbar et al., 2019). This will also hold social entrepre-
neurs to account, providing a new and transparent way of working, 
supporting meaningful relationships within the system, and enhancing 
trust between stakeholders. For example, prior research has indicated 
that social entrepreneurs who are outsiders or ‘foreigners’ to the com-
munity in which they intervene may cause more harm than good 
(Kimmitt and Muñoz, 2018; Tucker and Croom, 2020). This is partially 
driven by their egoistic behaviour but also their poor judgment of 
complex social settings (Dey and Lehner, 2017). As smart contracts are 
able to demonstrate data from beneficiaries concerning whether and 
how they are making a social/environmental difference, they hold the 
potential to mitigate these issues. 
4.0. A model for a social business blockchain 
One of the key concepts and discussions of this paper is the investi-
gation of smart contracts as a means of codifying the principles of a 
social business (Yunus et al., 2010). To achieve this aim, there are two 
clear areas which need to be bridged: the technical aspects and the social 
business components. The configuration of the stack defines the envi-
ronment in which the smart contracts are stored and the subsequent 
execution of transactions. In the creation of the social business block-
chain, we propose for a number of reasons that the infrastructure should 
be based on a public blockchain. First, Ethereum is an open-source, free 
blockchain platform which makes our proposed structure easy to 
reproduce (Bhargavan et al., 2016) and adheres to the principles of a 
social enterprise. Second, the most popular blockchain platforms that 
are currently being trialled by industry ‘blue chip’ companies are based 
on the Ethereum public blockchain (Forbes, 2019). 
Within a social business scenario, specific business objectives can be 
codified into a blockchain scenario. Our proposed model, however, re-
quires stakeholders to alter their trust relationships with social busi-
nesses. Instead of placing trust in the social businesses to uphold the 
balance of social and economic logics, stakeholders are required to trust 
the technology that underpins the blockchain, and to codify their ex-
pectations into smart contracts. Notably, this relates to trust in technical 
ability (or algorithmic trust) and transparency. In tandem, it requires 
stakeholders to place trust in the individuals responsible for the tech-
nical elements of the blockchain (i.e. the social layer). This would be 
achieved by enhancing dimensions of trust such as benevolence, integ-
rity, transparency and identification (Chawla, 2020; Pirson and Mal-
hotra, 2011). For example, integrity would enable stakeholders to gauge 
whether an individual is forthcoming, honest and of appropriate moral 
character (Mayer et al. 1995) to design a blockchain that upholds the 
ideals of a social business. The identification dimension can reassure 
stakeholders about value alignment and commitment to the principles of 
social business. As part of this codification process, we create seven 
smart contracts in response to the emerging questions identified earlier 
in the paper (see Table 5). 
In Table 5, we outline the basic logic which will govern our social 
business blockchain. Each smart contract has a clear role and is tasked 
with monitoring the conditions around each principle. This will be based 
on pre-agreed criteria as illustrated in Fig. 2 below. In our model all 
decisions are constantly checked in real time, and every decision is 
recorded. Each principle is linked to a specific contract and any anom-
alies can be tracked to a specific issue or principle. 
In our conceptualisation of a social business blockchain, we have 
specifically noted the role of trust in the interactions between the social 
business, its stakeholders and smart contracts, and how the system-
atisation of checking conditions (i.e. rejection or execution) can both 
elicit and impede trust. Our model highlights a ‘triangular’ trust rela-
tionship in a social business blockchain, between the social business, its 
stakeholders and the smart contracts. 
Introduction of smart contracts into the typical relationship between 
social business and stakeholder challenges the traditional issue sur-
rounding stakeholders: that they “have no alternative, in the absence of 
external constraints of self-interested behaviour but to rely on the 
trustworthiness of the organization” (Greenwood and Van Buren III, 
2010, p. 425). Smart contracts (and the blockchain) offer ‘the alterna-
tive’: to shift the trust, traditionally placed with the social businesses (to 
execute decisions on behalf of stakeholders), towards the technology 
and those that create it (i.e. balancing algorithmic trust and organisa-
tional trust). As our model shows, stakeholders still have a relationship 
with the social business, as would be expected, in achieving the coex-
istence of social and economic logics. More simply, it is expected that the 
stakeholders and the social businesses will define the parameters for the 
social business blockchain together (in conjunction with the technology 
experts who design the blockchain). 
Table 5 





Function purpose within social business 
SC 01 Principle 1 – [P1] Monitor the tensions between social and financial objectives. 
SC 02 Principle 2 – [P2] Balance financial sustainability with real-time data to ensure objectives are met. 
SC 03 Principle 3 – [P3] Contract monitors relationship objectives. Pre-agreed conditions which govern the relationship can be monitored in real time. 
SC 04 Principle 4 – [P4] Smart contracts are designed for financial transactions. With this contract, social businesses can ensure that investment supports 
growth based on agreed objectives. 
SC 05 Principle 5 – [P5] Using environmental benchmarks, this smart contract can monitor and implement rules based on decisions made. 
SC 06 Principle 6 – [P6] A blockchain can ensure that no decision is made against the wishes of stakeholders. Smart contracts can monitor all decisions and 
blockchain design can stop non-stakeholder decisions. 
SC 07 Principle 7 – [P7] Monitor all smart contracts to validate all transactions.  
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Our model also highlights how both the ‘reject’ and ‘execute’ func-
tions in relation to conditions in the blockchain can enhance and reduce 
trust. We suggest that when conditions are wrongly rejected from the 
blockchain, this could lead stakeholders to have reduced trust in the 
system as a result of the principles being poorly constructed (albeit that 
they would have contributed to this). However, rejection may also in-
crease trust, as it demonstrates transparency when a condition is not 
being met, indicating that the technology is working and leading to 
enhanced algorithmic trust. Similarly, it could be argued that when 
conditions are executed, trust can be built (i.e. the technology is oper-
ational and working), resulting in stakeholders feeling confident that 
they no longer have to rely on the social business to execute decisions on 
their behalf. In the same vein, continuous execution of conditions 
(without any rejections) may lead stakeholders to question if the system 
is functioning correctly, as continuous execution of contracts is rare in a 
blockchain scenario. Fig. 2 advances our knowledge of blockchain and 
outlines a first use case within a social business environment. This 
innovative use of blockchain opens multiple business use cases. 
5.0. Conclusion 
5.1. Overview 
In this paper, we set out to integrate emerging research on block-
chain and smart contracts with the social business literature with the 
purpose of building a conceptual social business blockchain. To provide 
a theoretical outline for doing this, we marry Yunus’ (2010) principles of 
social business with prior empirical research in this area. We further 
conceptualise trust as being the principal mechanism to allow social and 
economic business objectives to coexist through blockchain technology. 
In so doing, we make three contributions to the literature on social 
business and technological innovation. 
First, we build on the idea of social and economic logic coexistence 
by proposing how the social business blockchain can help facilitate 
harmony in social and economic business objectives. Theoretical per-
spectives of organisational identity (Moss et al., 2011), institutional 
logics (Battilana and Dorado, 2010) and hybrid organising (Gümüsay 
et al., 2020; Smith and Besharov, 2019) all presume that social busi-
nesses must balance social and economic objectives to be sustainable. 
Thus, social and economic objectives exist on a continuum, in constant 
tension with one another, and require ‘balancing’ for the business to 
operate smoothly. In our social business blockchain, we explain how 
blockchain technology can enable social and economic logics to coexist 
harmoniously (Muñoz and Kimmitt, 2019). 
To allow this coexistence to occur, smart contracts at the heart of the 
blockchain can enable trust to flow between the various stakeholders of 
the social business (i.e. beneficiaries, employees, volunteers and in-
vestors). This paper is the first of its kind to investigate the potential use 
of blockchain and smart contracts to monitor the interactions within a 
social business (see Fig. 2). One of the key functions of the blockchain is 
pre-agreed rules and adherence to them. As the blockchain is highly 
transparent, it offers collective monitoring of the achievement of social/ 
environmental impact (e.g. reducing homelessness) and financial sus-
tainability (e.g. income to run homelessness services). Thus, when trust 
is enabled through the blockchain, perhaps social and economic logics 
may harmoniously coexist rather than being in constant conflict, as prior 
literature suggests. 
Second, we build upon work by those who have established a 
connection between digital technology and social business (e.g. Daowd 
et al., 2020; Lanza-Cruz et al., 2018; Ashraf et al., 2019), highlighting 
the role of new technologies in enabling organisational effectiveness and 
social change. The literature on technology and social business is 
limited, mainly focusing on how the technological innovations offered 
by social entrepreneurs meet some social and/or environmental need 
(Ramani et al., 2017). On the one hand, research has highlighted how 
technology is used as part of a social intervention (e.g. as a method to 
power clean water to communities by harnessing a children’s 
merry-go-round) (Saunders, and Borland, 2013). On the other, research 
has emphasised how technology can be used to manage the data that 
social businesses collect on their social and economic performance 
(Jamieson et al., 2020). 
The model we propose in this paper positions the social business 
blockchain within those two domains. Because transparency and trust 
are at the centre of smart contracts in the blockchain, all stakeholders 
can have a more active role in holding the social business to account. 
The pre-agreeing of rules between all relevant stakeholders may also 
enable the improved co-design of social interventions, allowing com-
munities to define their own social problems and solutions to them 
Fig. 2. A social business blockchain framework  
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(Kimmitt and Muñoz, 2018). Whilst this is an important design feature, 
the social business blockchain similarly enables transparent data stor-
age, which is vital from a management information systems perspective. 
Taken together, these features can facilitate trust between parties and 
allow for the coexistence of the organisation’s social and economic ob-
jectives. In this respect, our social business blockchain responds to calls 
for detailed research into the conditions under which social enterprises 
may be more effective (Engelke et al., 2015). 
Third, by developing our social business blockchain, we present a 
conceptual map of how blockchain technology, utilising smart contracts, 
can be practically introduced as part of a new or existing social business 
model. Drawing on Yunus’ (2010) principles of social business, our 
model offers meaningful insights into how blockchain technology can 
support more sustainable social businesses, by improving trust, trans-
parency and effective and efficient interactions between stakeholders. 
We believe that this framework can inform practitioners and policy-
makers focusing on the area of social business of the advantages, but also 
challenges, of the different stages of the implementation and use of this 
technology. 
In particular, at a policy level, social businesses have gained much 
interest from governments globally. However, the supporting institu-
tional infrastructure and ecosystems vary. For example, the UK has a 
highly supportive environment for social enterprises, as well as the legal 
infrastructure that formalises social businesses as ‘Community Interest 
Companies’. It also has a highly collaborative culture where, for 
example, social businesses are contracted by public authorities to deliver 
particular services (Social Enterprise UK, 2017), thus normalising the 
obtaining of data and metrics to understand social business performance 
(Lowe and Wilson, 2017). In such a formalised environment, the 
implementation of a social business blockchain may be smoother, given 
the supporting infrastructure and linkage with pre-existing processes. 
For practitioners, our framework has clear managerial implications. 
Social entrepreneurs must strategically guide the social and economic 
logics of their ventures. Our blockchain framework, as well as the 
questions posed in Table 4, can act as sensemaking prompts for navi-
gating these logics through Yunus’ principles. For example, improved 
data transparency between social venture stakeholders can provide so-
cial entrepreneurs with the necessary understanding of how their 
products/services work in practice, providing the contextual informa-
tion to more easily understand the complex nature of social problems 
(Kimmitt and Muñoz, 2018). Further, the distributed nature of the 
blockchain may better enable managers to interpret impact data that 
drives performance management in social ventures. 
5.2. Limitations and directions for future research 
We recognise that there are both technical and academic limitations 
to implementing the model we have presented in this paper. First, 
technical limitations include specific issues related to blockchain 
implementation and skills. The blockchain is a relatively new technol-
ogy which has grown significantly over recent years. Much time and 
money have been spent on developing the infrastructure surrounding 
the blockchain, incurring expensive start-up costs due to hardware 
purchasing and energy usage (Jabbar and Dani, 2020). Given that many 
social businesses are already stretched for resources (both financial and 
human), the additional technical expenses may be difficult to justify and 
implement. In terms of human capital, there is a significant skills gap 
which would need to be addressed in the usage and development of 
blockchain solutions. This highlights that blockchain remains in its in-
fancy, leading us to the conclusion that further research into the factors 
that might encourage its mass adoption will be required before it can be 
classed as a mainstream option. 
Second, in more institutionally informal contexts, the use of a social 
business blockchain may be less straightforward. For example, in many 
emerging economies, the concept of a social business is poorly under-
stood, with low levels of cross-sector collaboration and understanding of 
social impact measurement (Muñoz and Kimmitt, 2019). It may be 
harder to implement novel new technological processes in contexts still 
grappling with the social business concept, and where the surrounding 
infrastructure is also relatively underdeveloped. Further, the kind of 
data needed to operationalise a social business blockchain may be more 
challenging in such contexts, where efforts to collect sufficient data (i.e. 
on social impact performance) are more resource intensive and less 
normalised in the sector. Alternatively, the implementation of such 
technologies in emerging social industry contexts may actually allow 
them to circumvent challenges around mission drift experience in more 
formalised environments; this would be a fruitful area for further 
investigation. 
In terms of academic limitations, we recognise that we have devel-
oped an ‘ideal type’ of solution in our social business blockchain. 
Although we draw on Yunus’ seven principles as the dominant approach 
to define the purpose and modus operandi of social businesses, other 
approaches exist. The intricacies of these different approaches may 
differ; however, we believe our framework provides a solid foundation 
upon which a number of social business blockchain models could be 
developed. Building on this, our model remains conceptual; for its 
effectiveness to be fully evaluated, it would need to be operationalised. 
With these limitations in mind, we consider three future directions for 
research. 
The first potential future direction is to address the practical imple-
mentation issue, by designing the smart contracts and algorithms pro-
posed in our conceptual model to test its effectiveness. This would 
involve choosing some or all of the principles, and could involve 
working with a social business and its stakeholders to pilot test the 
implementation of the smart contracts and system design. This would 
provide an opportunity to understand if, in practice, this social business 
blockchain this paper has developed could address the theoretical issues 
of trust. Second, future researchers should consider other models of 
social business, and improve upon the conceptual ideas that we have 
presented in the paper to provide a refined social business blockchain. 
Finally, we would encourage others to build upon the extant research 
surrounding ethics and blockchain to begin exploring the ethics of 
algorithmic trust when building smart contracts in a blockchain. We 
think that this is of particular interest in the social business context, 
whereby actors are held to a high moral standard, and multi-stakeholder 
‘voice’ is becoming more important in decision-making. 
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Muñoz, P., Kimmitt, J., 2019. Social mission as competitive advantage: a configurational 
analysis of the strategic conditions of social entrepreneurship. J. Bus. Res. 101, 
854–861. 
Pache, A.C., Santos, F., 2010. When worlds collide: the internal dynamics of 
organizational responses to conflicting institutional demands. Acad. Manage. Rev. 
35 (3), 455–476. 
Parhankangas, A., Renko, M., 2017. Linguistic style and crowdfunding success among 
social and commercial entrepreneurs. J. Bus. Ventur. 32 (2), 215–236. 
Pereira, J., Tavalaei, M.M., Ozalp, H., 2019. Blockchain-based platforms: decentralized 
infrastructures and its boundary conditions. Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change 146, 
94–102. 
Peerally, J.A., De Fuentes, C., Figueiredo, P.N., 2019. Inclusive innovation and the role of 
technological capability-building: the social business Grameen Danone Foods 
Limited in Bangladesh. Long Range Plann. 52 (6), 101843. 
Perrini, F., Vurro, C., Costanzo, L.A., 2010. A process-based view of social 
entrepreneurship: from opportunity identification to scaling-up social change in the 
case of San Patrignano. Entrepreneur. Region. Dev. 22 (6), 515–534. 
Pirson, M., Malhotra, D., 2011. Foundations of organizational trust: what matters to 
different stakeholders? Org. Sci. 22 (4), 1087–1104. 
Prashar, D., Jha, N., Lee, Y., 2020. Blockchain-based traceability and visibility for 
agricultural products: a decentralized way of ensuring food safety in India. 
Sustainability 12 (8), 3497. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers [PwC] (2018). PwC’s Global Blockchain Survey. Retrieved 12 
March 2021, from https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/industries/technology/blockchai 
n/blockchain-in-business.html. 
Queiroz, M.M., Wamba, S.F., 2019. Blockchain adoption challenges in supply chain: an 
empirical investigation of the main drivers in India and the USA. Int. J. Inf. Manage. 
46, 70–82. 
Ramani, S.V., SadreGhazi, S., Gupta, S., 2017. Catalysing innovation for social impact: 
the role of social enterprises in the Indian sanitation sector. Technol. Forecast. Soc. 
Change 121, 216–227. 
Rickert, A., 2017. Giving donors what they need. In: Petit, P., Yunus, M. (Eds.), Creating 
a New Civilization through Social Entrepreneurship. Routledge, New York, 
pp. 119–127. 
Roeck, D., Sternberg, H., Hofmann, E., 2019. Distributed ledger technology in supply 
chains: a transaction cost perspective. Int. J. Prod. Res. 58 (7), 1–18. 
Salmerón-Manzano, E., Manzano-Agugliaro, F., 2019. The role of smart contracts in 
sustainability: worldwide research trends. Sustainability 11 (11), 3049. 
Saunders, S.G., Borland, R., 2013. Marketing-driven philanthropy: the case of 
PlayPumps. Eur. Bus. Rev. 25 (4), 321–335. 
Scarlata, M., Alemany, L., 2010. Deal structuring in philanthropic venture capital 
investments: financing instrument, valuation and covenants. J. Bus. Ethics 95 (2), 
121–145. 
Scarlata, M., Alemany, L., Zacharakis, A., 2012. Philanthropic venture capital: venture 
capital for social entrepreneurs? Found. Trend. Entrepreneur. 8 (4), 279–342. 
Scarlata, M., Walske, J., Zacharakis, A., 2017. Ingredients matter: how the human capital 
of philanthropic and traditional venture capital differs. J. Bus. Ethics 145 (3), 
623–635. 
Schlecht, L., Schneider, S., Buchwald, A., 2021. The prospective value creation potential 
of Blockchain in business models: a delphi study. Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change 
166. 
Schmidt, C.G., Wagner, S., 2019. Blockchain and supply chain relations: a transaction 
cost theory perspective. J. Purchas. Suppl. Manag. 25 (4), 1005–1052. 
Schoorman, F.D., Mayer, R.C., Davis, J., 2007. An integrative model of organizational 
trust: past, present, and future. Acad. Manage. Rev. 32 (2), 344–354. 
Seanor, P., Meaton, J., 2008. Learning from failure, ambiguity and trust in social 
enterprise. Soc. Enterpr. J. 4 (1), 24–40. 
Servantie, V., Rispal, M.H., 2018. Bricolage, effectuation, and causation shifts over time 
in the context of social entrepreneurship. Entrepreneur. Region. Dev. 30 (3-4), 
310–335. 
Sharples, M., 2002. Disruptive devices: mobile technology for conversational learning. 
Int. J. Cont. Eng. Educ. Life Long Learn. 12 (5-6), 504–520. 
Sheppard, B.H., Sherman, D.A., 1998. The grammars of trust: a model and general 
implications. Acad. Manage. Rev. 23 (3), 422–437. 
Siebold, N., Günzel-Jensen, F., Müller, S., 2019. Balancing dual missions for social 
venture growth: a comparative case study. Entrepreneur. Region. Dev. 31 (9-10), 
710–734. 
Sitkin, S.B., Roth, N.L., 1993. Explaining the limited effectiveness of legalistic ‘remedies’ 
for trust/distrust. Org. Sci. 4 (3), 367–392. 
Siwale, J, Kimmitt, J., & Amankwah-Amoah, J. (2021). The failure of hybrid 
organizations: a legitimation perspective. Manag. Org. Rev., (forthcoming). 
Smart Energy International (2020). AI, Blockchain Powered Microgrid Pilots Renewables 
Trading in Port of Rotterdam. Retrieved 21 March 2021, from https://www.smart-en 
ergy.com/regional-news/europe-uk/ai-blockchain-microgrid-pilots-renewables-tra 
ding-in-port-of-rotterdam/. 
Smith, W.K., Besharov, M.L., 2019. Bowing before dual gods: how structured flexibility 
sustains organizational hybridity. Adm. Sci. Q. 64 (1), 1–44. 
Smith, W.K., Gonin, M., Besharov, M.L., 2013. Managing social-business tensions: a 
review and research agenda for social enterprise. Bus. Ethics Q. 23 (3), 407–442. 
Social Enterprise UK (2017). The Future of Business – State of Social Enterprise Survey. 
Retrieved 8 March 2021, from https://www.socialenterprise.org.uk/the-future-of- 
business-state-of-social-enterprise-survey-2017/. 
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